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Figure 1: DeeperForensics-1.0 dataset is a new large-scale dataset for real-world face forgery detection.
Abstract
In this paper, we present our on-going effort of con-
structing a large-scale benchmark, DeeperForensics-1.0,
for face forgery detection. Our benchmark represents the
largest face forgery detection dataset by far, with 60, 000
videos constituted by a total of 17.6 million frames, 10
times larger than existing datasets of the same kind. Exten-
sive real-world perturbations are applied to obtain a more
challenging benchmark of larger scale and higher diversity.
All source videos in DeeperForensics-1.0 are carefully col-
lected, and fake videos are generated by a newly proposed
end-to-end face swapping framework. The quality of gen-
erated videos outperforms those in existing datasets, vali-
dated by user studies. The benchmark features a hidden test
set, which contains manipulated videos achieving high de-
ceptive scores in human evaluations. We further contribute
a comprehensive study that evaluates five representative de-
tection baselines and make a thorough analysis of differ-
ent settings. We believe this dataset will contribute to real-
world face forgery detection research.12
1Code, model and data will be made publicly available.
2Project page: https://liming-jiang.com/projects/DrF1/DrF1.html.
1. Introduction
Face swapping has become an emerging topic in com-
puter vision and graphics. Indeed, many works [1, 2, 4]
on automatic face swapping have been proposed in recent
years. These efforts have circumvented the cumbersome
and tedious manual face editing processes, hence expedit-
ing the advancement in face editing. At the same time, such
enabling technology has sparked legitimate concerns, par-
ticularly on its potential for being misused and abused. The
popularization of “Deepfakes” on the internet has further
set off alarm bells among the general public and authori-
ties, in view of the conceivable perilous implications. Ac-
cordingly, there is a dire need for countermeasures to be in
place promptly, particularly innovations that can effectively
detect videos that have been manipulated.
Working towards forgery detection, various groups have
contributed datasets (e.g., FaceForensics++ [37], Deep Fake
Detection [9] and DFDC [14]) comprising manipulated
video footages. The availability of these datasets has
undoubtedly provided essential avenues for research into
forgery detection. Nonetheless, the aforementioned datasets
suffer several drawbacks. Videos in these datasets are ei-
ther of a small number, of low quality, or overly artifi-
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cial. Understandably, these datasets are inadequate to train
a good model for effective forgery detection in real-world
scenarios. This is particularly true when current advances
in human face editing are able to produce extremely realis-
tic videos, rendering forgery detection a highly challenging
task. On another note, we observe high similarity between
training and test videos, in terms of their distribution, in cer-
tain works [30, 37]. Their actual efficacy in detecting real-
world face forgery cases, which are much more variable and
unpredictable, remains to be further elucidated.
We believe that forgery detection models can only be
enhanced when trained with a dataset that is exhaustive
enough to encompass as many potential real-world varia-
tions as possible. To this end, we propose a large-scale
dataset named DeeperForensics-1.0 consisting of 60, 000
videos with a total of 17.6 million frames for real-world face
forgery detection. The main steps of our dataset construc-
tion are shown in Figure 1. We set forth three yardsticks
when constructing this dataset: 1) Quality. The dataset
shall contain videos more realistic and much closer to the
distribution of real-world detection scenarios. (details in
Section 3.1 and 3.2) 2) Scale. The dataset shall be made
up of a large-scale video sets. (details in Section 3.3) 3)
Diversity. There shall be sufficient variations in the video
footages (e.g., compression, blurry, transmission errors) to
match those that may be encountered in the real world (de-
tails in Section 3.3).
The primary challenge in the preparation of this dataset
is the lack of good-quality video footages. Specifically,
most publicly available videos are shot under an uncon-
strained environment resulting in large variations, including
but not limited to suboptimal illumination, large occlusion
of the target faces, and extreme head poses. Importantly, the
lack of official informed consents from the video subjects
precludes the use of these videos, even for non-commercial
purposes. On the other hand, while some videos of manip-
ulated faces are deceptively real, a larger number remains
easily distinguishable by human eyes. The latter is often
caused by model negligence towards appearance variations
or temporal differences, leading to preposterous and incon-
gruous results.
We approach the aforementioned challenge from two
perspectives. 1) Collecting fresh face data from 100 in-
dividuals with informed consents (details in Section 3.1)
2) Devising a novel method, DeepFake Variational Auto-
Encoder (DF-VAE), to enhance existing videos (details in
Section 3.2). In addition, we introduce diversity into the
video footages through deliberate addition of distortions
and perturbations, simulating real-world scenarios. We col-
late the newly collected data and the DF-VAE-modified
videos into the DeeperForensics-1.0 dataset, with the aim
of further expanding it gradually over time. We benchmark
five representative open-source forgery detection methods
using our DeeperForensics-1.0 dataset as well as a hidden
test set containing manipulated videos that achieve high de-
ceptive ranking in user studies.
We summarize our contributions as follows: 1) We pro-
pose a new dataset, DeeperForensics-1.0 that is larger in
scale than existing ones, of high quality and rich diver-
sity. To improve its quality, we introduce a carefully de-
signed data collection and a novel framework, DF-VAE,
that effectively mitigate the obvious fabricated effects of
existing manipulated videos. DeeperForensics-1.0 dataset
shall facilitate future research in forgery detection of hu-
man faces in real-world scenarios. 2) We benchmark results
of existing representative forgery detection methods on our
DeeperForensics-1.0 dataset, offering insights into the cur-
rent status and future improvisation strategy in face forgery
detection.
2. Related Work
This paper includes two main aspects of face forgery de-
tection related to other works: dataset and benchmark. We
will cover some important works in this section.
Face forgery detection datasets. Building a dataset for
forgery detection requires a huge amount of effort on
data collection and manipulation. Early forgery detection
datasets are based on images under highly restrictive condi-
tions, e.g., MICC F2000 [7], Wild Web dataset [50], Real-
istic Tampering dataset [28].
Owing to the urgency in video-based face forgery detec-
tion, some prominent groups have devoted their efforts to
create face forensics video datasets (see Table 1). UADFV
[49] contains 98 videos, i.e., 49 real videos from YouTube
and 49 fake ones generated by FakeAPP [5]. DeepFake-
TIMIT [27] manually selects 16 similar looking pairs of
people from VidTIMIT [39] database. For each of the 32
subjects, they generate about 10 videos using low-quality
and high-quality versions of faceswap-GAN [4], resulting
in a total of 620 fake videos. Celeb-DF [30] includes 408
YouTube videos, mostly of celebrities, from which 795
fake videos are synthesized. FaceForensics++ [37] is the
first large-scale face forensic dataset that consists of 4000
fake videos manipulated by four methods (i.e., DeepFakes
[2], Face2Face [42], FaceSwap [3], NeuralTextures [41])),
and 1000 real videos from YouTube. Afterwards, Google
joins FaceForensics++ and contributes Deep Fake Detec-
tion [9] dataset with 3431 real and fake videos from 28 ac-
tors. Recently, Facebook invites 66 individuals and builds
the DFDC preview dataset [14], which includes 5214 origi-
nal and tampered videos with three types of augmentations.
In comparison, we invite 100 paid actors and collect
high-resolution (1920 × 1080) source data with various
poses, expressions, and illuminations. 3DMM blendshapes
[10] are taken as reference to supplement some extremely
exaggerated expressions. We get consents from all the ac-
tors for using and manipulating their faces. In contrast to
prior works, we also propose a new end-to-end face swap-
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Table 1: The most relevant datasets compared to our dataset. DeeperForensics-1.0 is an order of magnitude in scale than existing datasets
w.r.t. both real and fake parts. We build a professional indoor environment to better control the important attributes of the collected
data. 100 paid actors give consents to the use and manipulation of their faces by signing a formal agreement. We employ seven types
of perturbations at five intensity levels, leading to 35 perturbations in total. The video may be subjected to a mixture of more than one
perturbation. In contrast to prior works, we also introduce a new end-to-end high-fidelity face swapping method.
Dataset Total videos
Ratio
(real : fake)
Controlled
Capture
Consented
Actors
Perturbations
(total number)
Perturbations
(mixture)
New
Method
UADFV [49] 98 1 : 1 × – – × ×
DeepFake-TIMIT [27] 620 only fake × – – × ×
Celeb-DF [30] 1203 1 : 1.95 × – – × ×
FaceForensics++ [37] 5000 1 : 4 × – 2 × ×
Deep Fake Detection [9]
(joins FaceForensics++) 3431 1 : 8.5 × 28 – × ×
DFDC Preview Dataset [14] 5214 1 : 3.6 × 66 3 × ×
DeeperForensics-1.0 (Ours) 60000 5 : 1 4 100 35 4 4
ping method (i.e., DF-VAE) and systematically apply seven
types of perturbations to the fake videos at five intensity lev-
els. The mixture of distortions to a single video make our
dataset better imitate real-world scenarios. Ultimately, we
construct DeeperForensics-1.0 dataset, which contains up
to 60, 000 high-quality videos with a total of 17.6 million
frames.
Face forgery detection benchmarks. Recently, a new
prominent benchmark, FaceForensics Benchmark [37], for
facial manipulation detection has been proposed. The
benchmark includes six image-level face forgery detection
baselines [6, 8, 12, 13, 15, 36]. Although FaceForensics
Benchmark adds distortions to the videos by converting
them into different compression rates, a deeper exploration
of more perturbation types and their mixture is missing.
Celeb-DF [30] also provides a face forgery detection bench-
mark including seven methods [6, 12, 29, 32, 34, 49, 51]
trained and tested on different datasets. In aforementioned
benchmarks, the test set usually shares a similar distribution
with the training set. Such an assumption inherently intro-
duces biases and renders these methods impractical for face
forgery detection in real-world settings with much more di-
verse and unknown fake videos.
In our benchmark, we introduce a challenging hidden
test set with manipulated videos that achieve high deceptive
scores in user studies, to better simulate real-world distribu-
tion. Various perturbations are analyzed to make our bench-
mark more comprehensive. In addition, we mainly exploit
video-level forgery detection baselines [11, 17, 19, 43, 45]
in this work. Temporal information – a significant cue for
video forgery detection besides single-frame quality – has
been considered. We will elaborate our benchmark in Sec-
tion 4.
3. A New Large-Scale Face Forensics Dataset
The main contribution of this paper is a new large-
scale dataset for real-world face forgery detection,
DeeperForensics-1.0, which provides an alternative to ex-
YouTube Source Target Swapped
Collected Source Target Swapped
Figure 2: Comparison of using only YouTube video and the col-
lected video as source data, with the same method and setting.
isting databases. DeeperForensics-1.0 consists of 60, 000
videos with 17.6 million frames in total, including 50, 000
original collected videos and 10, 000 manipulated videos.
To construct a dataset more suitable for real-world face
forgery detection, we design this dataset with careful con-
sideration of quality, scale, and diversity. In Section 3.1
and 3.2, we will discuss the details of data collection and
methodology (i.e., DF-VAE) to improve quality. In Sec-
tion 3.3, we will show how to ensure large scale and high
diversity of DeeperForensics-1.0.
3.1. Data Collection
Source data is the first factor that highly affects qual-
ity. Taking results in Figure 2 as an example, the source
data collection increases the robustness of our face swap-
ping method to extreme poses, since videos on the internet
usually have limited head pose variations.
We refer to the identity in the driving video as the “tar-
get” face and the identity of the face that is swapped onto
the driving video as the “source” face. Different from previ-
ous works, we find that the source faces play a much more
critical role than the target faces in building a high-quality
3
Figure 3: Diversity in identities, poses, expressions, and illuminations in our collected source data.
Figure 4: Examples of 3DMM blendshapes in our data collection.
dataset. Specifically, the expressions, poses, and lighting
conditions of source faces should be much richer in order to
perform robust face swapping. Hence, our data collection
mainly focuses on source face videos. Figure 3 shows the
diversity in different attributes of our data collection.
We invited 100 paid actors to record the source videos.
Similar to [9, 14], we obtained consents from all the actors
for using and manipulating their faces to avoid the portrait
right issues. The participants were carefully selected to en-
sure variability in genders, ages, skin colors, and nationali-
ties. We tried to maintain a roughly equal proportion w.r.t.
each of the attributes above. In particular, we invited 53
males and 47 females from 26 countries. The age ranges
from 20 to 45 years old to match the most common age
group appearing on real-world videos. The actors have four
typical skin tones: white, black, yellow, brown, with ratio
1:1:1:1. All faces are clean without glasses or decorations.
Different from previous data collection in the wild (see
Table 1), we built a professional indoor environment for a
more controllable data collection. We only use the facial
regions (detected and cropped by LAB [47]) of the source
data, so we can neglect the background. We set seven HD
cameras from different angles: front, left, left-front, right,
right-front, oblique-above, oblique-below. The resolution
of our recorded videos is high (1920×1080). We trained the
Figure 5: Examples of style mismatch problems in prominent face
forensics datasets.
actors in advance to keep the collection process smooth. We
requested the actors to turn their heads and speak naturally
with eight expressions: neutral, angry, happy, sad, surprise,
contempt, disgust, fear. The head poses range from −90◦
to +90◦. Furthermore, the actors were asked to perform 53
expressions defined in 3DMM blendshapes [10] (see Fig-
ure 4) to supplement some extremely exaggerated expres-
sions. When performing 3DMM blendshapes, the actors
also spoke naturally to avoid excessive frames that show a
closed mouth.
In addition to expressions and poses, we systematically
set nine lighting conditions from various directions: uni-
form, left, top-left, bottom-left, right, top-right, bottom-
right, top, bottom. The actors were only asked to turn their
heads under uniform illumination, so the lighting remains
unchanged on specific facial regions to avoid many dupli-
cate data samples recorded by the cameras set at different
angles. In the end, our collected data contain over 50, 000
videos with a total of 12.6 million frames – an order of mag-
nitude more than existing datasets.
3.2. DeepFake Variational Auto-Encoder
To tackle low visual quality problems of previous works,
we consider three key requirements in formulating a high-
fidelity face swapping method: 1) It should be general and
scalable for us to generate large number of videos with high
quality. 2) The problem of face style mismatch caused by
appearance variations need to be addressed. Some failure
cases of existing methods are shown in Figure 5. 3) Tem-
poral continuity of generated videos should be taken into
consideration.
4
Figure 6: The main framework of DeepFake Variational Auto-Encoder. In training, we reconstruct the source and target faces in blue and
orange arrows, respectively, by extracting landmarks and constructing an unpaired sample as the condition. Optical flow differences are
minimized after reconstruction to improve temporal continuity. In inference, we swap the latent codes and get the reenacted face in green
arrows. Subsequent MAdaIN module fuses the reenacted face and the original background resulting in the swapped face.
Based on the aforementioned requirements, we propose
DeepFake Variational Auto-Encoder (DF-VAE), a novel
learning-based face swapping framework. DF-VAE con-
sists of three main parts, namely a structure extraction mod-
ule, a disentangled module, and a fusion module. We will
give a brief and intuitive understanding of the DF-VAE
framework below. Please refer to the Appendix for detailed
derivations and results.
Disentanglement of structure and appearance. The first
step of our method is face reenactment – animating the
source face with similar expression as the target face, with-
out any paired data. Face swapping is considered as a subse-
quent step of face reenactment that performs fusion between
the reenacted face and the target background. For robust
and scalable face reenactment, we should cleanly disentan-
gle structure (i.e., expression and pose) and appearance rep-
resentation (i.e., texture, skin color, etc.) of a face. This
disentanglement is rather difficult because structure and ap-
pearance representation are far from independent. We de-
scribe our solution as follows.
Let x1:T ≡ {x1, x2, ..., xT } ∈ X be a sequence of
source face video frames, and y1:T ≡ {y1, y2, ..., yT } ∈ Y
be the sequence of corresponding target face video frames.
We first simplify our problem and only consider two spe-
cific snapshots at time t, xt and yt. Let x˜t, y˜t, dt represent
the reconstructed source face, the reconstructed target face,
and the reenacted face, respectively.
Consider the reconstruction procedure of the source face
xt. Let sx denotes the structure representation and ax de-
notes the appearance information. The face generator can
be depicted as the posteriori estimate pθ (xt|sx, ax). The
solution of our reconstruction goal, marginal log-likelihood
x˜t ∼ log pθ (xt), by a common Variational Auto-Encoder
(VAE) [26] can be written as:
log pθ (xt) = DKL (qφ (sx, ax|xt) ‖pθ (sx, ax|xt))
+L (θ, φ;xt) ,
(1)
where qφ is an approximate posterior to achieve the evi-
dence lower bound (ELBO) in the intractable case, and the
second RHS term L (θ, φ;xt) is the variational lower bound
w.r.t. both the variational parameters φ and generative pa-
rameters θ.
In Eq. 1, we assume that both sx and ax are latent priors
computed by the same posterior xt. However, the separa-
tion of these two variables in the latent space is rather diffi-
cult without additional conditions. Therefore, we employ a
simple yet effective approach to disentangle these two vari-
ables.
The blue arrows in Figure 6 demonstrate the reconstruc-
tion procedure of the source face xt. Instead of feeding a
single source face xt, we sample another source face x′ to
construct unpaired data in the source domain. To make the
structure representation more evident, we use the stacked
hourglass networks [33] to extract landmarks of xt in the
structure extraction module and get the heatmap xˆt. Then
we feed the heatmap xˆt to the Structure Encoder Eα, and x′
to the Appearance Encoder Eβ . We concatenate the latent
representations (small cubes in red and green) and feed it to
the Decoder Dγ . Finally, we get the reconstructed face x˜t,
i.e., marginal log-likelihood of xt.
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Figure 7: Many-to-many (three-to-three) face swapping by a single model with obvious reduction of style mismatch problems. This figure
shows the results between three source identities and three target identities. The whole process is end-to-end.
Therefore, the latent structure representation sx in Eq. 1
becomes a more evident heatmap representation xˆt, which
is introduced as a new condition. The unpaired sample x′
with the same identity w.r.t. xt is another condition, being
a substitute for ax. Eq. 1 can be rewritten as a conditional
log-likelihood:
log pθ (xt|xˆt, x′) = DKL (qφ (zx|xt, xˆt, x′) ‖pθ (zx|xt, xˆt, x′))
+L (θ, φ;xt, xˆt, x
′) ,
(2)
The first RHS term KL-divergence is non-negative, we get:
log pθ
(
xt|xˆt, x′
) ≥ L(θ, φ;xt, xˆt, x′)
= Eqφ(zx|xt,xˆt,x′)
[− log qφ (zx|xt, xˆt, x′)+ log pθ (xt, zx|xˆt, x′)] ,
(3)
and L(θ, φ;xt, xˆt, x′) can also be written as:
L (θ, φ;xt, xˆt, x
′) =−DKL (qφ (zx|xt, xˆt, x′) ‖pθ (zx|xˆt, x′))
+ Eqφ(zx|xt,xˆt,x′) [log pθ (xt|zx, xˆt, x′)] .
(4)
We let the variational approximate posterior be a multi-
variate Gaussian with a diagonal covariance structure:
log qφ (zx|xt, xˆt, x′) ≡ logN
(
zx;µ, σ
2I
)
, (5)
where I is an identity matrix. Exploiting the reparam-
eterization trick [26], the non-differentiable operation of
sampling can become differentiable by an auxiliary vari-
able with independent marginal. In this case, zx ∼
qφ (zx|xt, xˆt, x′) is implemented by zx = µ + σ where
 is an auxiliary noise variable  ∼ N (0, 1). Finally, the
approximate posterior qφ(zx|xt, xˆt, x′) is estimated by the
separated encoders, Structure Encoder Eα and Appearance
Encoder Eβ , in an end-to-end training process by standard
gradient descent.
We discuss the whole workflow of reconstructing the
source face. In the target face domain, the reconstruction
procedure is the same, as shown by orange arrows in Fig-
ure 6.
During training, the network learns structure and appear-
ance information in both the source and the target domains.
It is noteworthy that even if both yt and x′ belong to arbi-
trary identities, our effective disentangled module is capable
of learning meaningful structure and appearance informa-
tion of each identity. During inference, we concatenate the
appearance prior of x′ and the structure prior of yt (small
cubes in red and orange) in the latent space, and the re-
constructed face dt shares the same structure with yt and
keeps the appearance of x′. Our framework allows concate-
nations of structure and appearance latent codes extracted
from arbitrary identities in inference and permits many-to-
many face reenactment.
In summary, DF-VAE is a new conditional variational
auto-encoder [25] with robustness and scalability. It condi-
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Raw Video w/o MAdaIN w/ MAdaIN
Figure 8: Comparison of the swapped face styles without or with
MAdaIN module.
tions on two posteriors in different domains. In the disen-
tangled module, the separated design of two encoders Eα
and Eβ , the explicit structure heatmap, and the unpaired
data construction jointly force Eα to learn structure infor-
mation and Eβ to learn appearance information.
Style matching and fusion. To fix the obvious style mis-
match problems as shown in Figure 5, we introduce a
masked adaptive instance normalization (MAdaIN) module.
We place a typical AdaIN [20] network after the reenacted
face dt. In the face swapping scenario, we only need to
adjust the style of the face area and use the original back-
ground. Therefore, we use a mask mt to guide AdaIN [20]
network to focus on style matching of the face area. To
avoid boundary artifacts, we apply Gaussian Blur tomt and
get the blurred mask mbt .
In our face swapping context, dt is the content input of
MAdaIN, yt is the style input. MAdaIN adaptively com-
putes the affine parameters from the face area of the style
input:
MAdaIN (c, s) = σ (s)
(
c− µ (c)
σ (c)
)
+ µ (s) , (6)
where c = mbt · dt, s = mbt · yt. With the very low-
cost MAdaIN module, we reconstruct dt again by Decoder
Dδ . The blurred mask mbt is used again to fuse the recon-
structed image with the background of yt. At last, we get
the swapped face dt. Figure 8 shows the effectiveness of
MAdaIN module for style matching and fusion.
The MAdaIN module is jointly trained with the disen-
tangled module in an end-to-end manner. Thus, by a single
model, DF-VAE can perform many-to-many face swapping
with obvious reduction of style mismatch and facial bound-
ary artifacts (see Figure 7 for the face swapping between
three source identities and three target identities). Even if
there are multiple identities in both the source domain and
the target domain, the quality of face swapping does not de-
grade.
Temporal consistency constraint. Temporal discontinuity
of fake videos leads to obvious flickering of the face area,
making them very easy to be spotted by forgery detection
methods and human eyes. To improve temporal continuity,
we let the disentangled module to learn temporal informa-
tion of both the source face and the target face.
Table 2: Seven types of distortions in DeeperForensics-1.0.
No. Distortion Type
1 Color saturation change
2 Local block-wise distortion
3 Color contrast change
4 Gaussian blur
5 White Gaussian noise in color components
6 JPEG compression
7 Video compression rate change
For simplification, we make a Markov assumption that
the generation of the frame at time t sequentially depends
on its previous P frames x(t−p):(t−1). In our experiment,
we set P = 1 to balance quality improvement and training
time.
In order to build the relationship between a current frame
and previous ones, we further make an intuitive assumption
that the optical flows should remain unchanged after recon-
struction. We use FlowNet 2.0 [21] to estimate the optical
flow x˜f w.r.t. x˜t and xt−1, xf w.r.t. xt and xt−1. Since face
swapping is sensitive to minor facial details which can be
greatly affected by flow estimation, we do not warp xt−1 by
the estimated flow like [46]. Instead, we minimize the dif-
ference between x˜f and xf to improve temporal continuity
while keeping stable facial detail generation. To this end,
we propose a new temporal consistency constraint, which
can be written as:
Ltemporal =
1
CHW
‖x˜f − xf‖1, (7)
where C = 2 for a common form of optical flow.
We only discuss the temporal continuity w.r.t. the source
face in this section because the case of the target face is the
same. If multiple identities exist in one domain, temporal
information of all these identities can be learned in an end-
to-end manner.
3.3. Scale and Diversity
Our extensive data collection and the proposed DF-VAE
method are designed to improve the quality of manipulated
videos in DeeperForensics-1.0 dataset. In this section, we
will mainly discuss the scale and diversity aspects.
We provide 10, 000 manipulated videos with 5 million
frames. It is also an order of magnitude more than the pre-
vious datasets. Thanks to the scalability and multimodal-
ity of DF-VAE, the time overhead of model training and
data generation is reduced to 1/5 compared to the common
Deepfakes methods, with no degradation in quality. Thus, a
larger-scale dataset construction is possible.
We take 1000 refined YouTube videos collected by Face-
Forensics++ [37] as the target videos. Each face of our col-
lected 100 identities is swapped onto 10 target videos, thus
1000 raw manipulated videos are generated directly by DF-
VAE in an end-to-end process.
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To ensure diversity, we apply various perturbations to
better simulate videos in real scenes. Specifically, as shown
in Table 2, seven types of distortions defined in Image Qual-
ity Assessment (IQA) [31, 35] are included. Each of these
distortions is divided into five intensity levels. We apply
random-type distortions to the 1000 raw manipulated videos
at five different intensity levels, producing a total of 5000
manipulated videos. Besides, 1000 more robust manipu-
lated videos are generated by adding random-type, random-
level distortions to the 1000 raw manipulated videos. More-
over, in contrast to all the previous datasets, each sample
of another 3000 manipulated videos in DeeperForensics-
1.0 is subjected to a mixture of more than one distortion.
The variability of perturbations improves the diversity of
DeeperForensics-1.0 to better imitate the data distribution
of real-world scenarios.
DeeperForensics-1.0 is a new large-scale dataset con-
sisting of over 60, 000 videos with 17.6 million frames
for real-world face forgery detection. High-quality source
videos and manipulated videos constitute two main contri-
butions of the dataset. The diversity of perturbations ap-
plying to the manipulated videos ensures the robustness of
DeeperForensics-1.0 to simulate real scenes. The whole
dataset will be released, free to all research communities,
for developing face forgery detection and more general hu-
man face related research.
3.4. User Study
To examine the quality of our DeeperForensics-1.0
dataset, we engage 100 professional participants, most of
whom specialize in computer vision research. We believe
these participants are qualified and well-trained in assessing
realness of tempered videos. The user study is conducted on
DeeperForensics-1.0 and six former datasets, i.e., UADFV
[49], DeepFake-TIMIT [27], Celeb-DF [30], FaceForen-
sics++ [37], Deep Fake Detection [9], DFDC [14]. We ran-
domly select 30 video clips from each of these datasets and
prepare a platform for the participants to evaluate their real-
ness. Similar to the user study of [23], the participants are
asked to provide their feedbacks to the statement “The video
clip looks real.” and give scores at five levels (1-clearly dis-
agree, 2-weakly disagree, 3-borderline, 4-weakly agree, 5-
clearly agree. We assume that users who give a score of 4
or 5 think the video is “real”). The user study results are
shown in Table 3. The quality of our dataset is appreci-
ated by most of the participants. Compared to the previous
datasets, DeeperForensics-1.0 achieves the highest realism
rating. Although Celeb-DF [30] also gets very high realness
scores, the scale of our dataset is much larger.
4. Video Forgery Detection Benchmark
Dataset split. In our benchmark, we exploit 1000 raw ma-
nipulated videos in Section 3.3 and 1000 YouTube videos
from FaceForensics++ [37] as our standard set. The videos
Table 3: The percentage of user study ratings for UADFV,
DeepFake-TIMIT, Celeb-DF, FaceForensics++, Deep Fake Detec-
tion, DFDC, and DeeperForensics-1.0 dataset. A higher score
means the users think the videos are more realistic.
Dataset 1 2 3 4 5 “real”
UADFV [49] 29.2 36.0 20.7 8.9 5.2 14.1%
DeepFake-TIMIT [27] 31.4 31.4 24.8 9.6 2.7 12.3%
Celeb-DF [30] 5.6 14.8 18.6 24.2 36.9 61.0%
FaceForensics++ [37] 46.8 31.4 13.4 4.4 4.0 8.4%
Deep Fake Detection [9] 26.0 28.0 24.1 11.5 10.3 21.9%
DFDC [14] 25.4 29.7 22.0 11.9 11.1 23.0%
DeeperForensics-1.0 (Ours) 4.3 8.9 22.6 29.8 34.3 64.1%
are split into training, validation, and test set with a ratio of
7 : 1 : 2. The identities of the swapped faces may be dupli-
cated because the faces of 100 invited actors are swapped
onto 1000 driving videos. To avoid data leak, we randomly
choose unrepeated 70, 10 and 20 identities, and group all
the videos according to the identities. Similar to [37], the
test and training sets share a close distribution in our stan-
dard set.
Other experiments in our benchmark are different vari-
ants of the standard set. They share the same 1000 driving
videos with the standard set. We will detail the variants in
Section 4.2. For a fair comparison, all the experiments are
conducted in the same split setting.
Hidden test set. For real-world scenarios, some experi-
ments conducted in previous works [30, 37] may not per-
form a convincing evaluation due to the huge biases caused
by a close distribution between the training and the test sets.
The aforementioned standard set has the same setting with
these works. As a result, strong detection baselines obtain
very high accuracy on the standard test set as demonstrated
in Section 4.2. However, the ultimate goal of the face foren-
sics dataset is to help detect forgery in real scenes. Even if
the accuracy on the standard test set is high, the models may
easily fail in real-world scenarios.
We argue that the test set of real-world face forgery de-
tection should not share a close distribution with the train-
ing set. What we need is a test set that better simulates the
real-world setting. We call it “hidden” test set. To better im-
itate fake videos in the real scene, the hidden test set should
satisfy three factors: 1) Diverse distortions. Different per-
turbations should be taken into consideration. 2) Multiple
sources. Fake videos in-the-wild should be manipulated by
different unknown methods. 3) High quality. Fake videos
that are threatening should have high quality to fool human
eyes.
Thus, in our initial benchmark, we introduce a challeng-
ing hidden test set with 400 carefully selected videos. First,
we collect fake videos generated by several unknown face
swapping methods to ensure multiple sources. Then, we ob-
scure all selected videos multiple times with diverse hidden
distortions that are commonly seen in real scenes. Finally,
we only select videos that can fool at least 50 out of 100
human observers in a user study. The ground truth labels
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Table 4: The binary detection accuracy of the baselines on the
hidden test set when trained on four manipulated methods in
FaceForensics++ (FF++): DeepFakes (DF), Face2Face (F2F),
FaceSwap (FS), NeuralTextures (NT), and DeeperForensics-1.0
standard training set without distortions.
Train FF++ DF FF++ F2F FF++ FS FF++ NT DeeperForensics-1.0
Test (acc) hidden hidden hidden hidden hidden
C3D [43] 57.50 57.75 52.13 58.25 74.75
TSN [45] 57.63 57.25 53.50 57.38 77.00
I3D [11] 56.63 58.38 54.63 63.63 79.25
ResNet+LSTM [17, 19] 57.38 56.13 54.88 59.50 78.25
XceptionNet [12] 57.38 58.75 54.75 57.38 77.00
are hidden and are used on our host server to evaluate the
accuracy of detection models. Besides, the hidden test set
will be enlarged constantly to get future versions along with
development of Deepfakes technology. Fake videos manip-
ulated by future face swapping methods will be included as
long as they can pass the human test supported by us.
4.1. Baselines
Existing studies [30, 37] primarily provide image-level
face forgery detection benchmark. However, fake videos
in-the-wild are much more menacing than manipulated im-
ages. We propose to conduct evaluation mainly based on
video classification methods for two reasons. First, image-
level face forgery detection methods do not consider any
temporal information – an important cue for video-based
tasks. Second, image-level face forgery detection methods
have been widely studied. We only choose one image-level
method XceptionNet [12], which achieves the best perfor-
mance in [37], as one part of our benchmark for reference.
The other four video-based baselines are C3D [43], TSN
[45], I3D [11], and ResNet+LSTM [17, 19], which have
achieved promising results in video classification tasks. De-
tails of all the baselines will be introduced in our Appendix.
4.2. Results and Analysis
Owing to the goal of detecting fakes in real-world sce-
narios, we mainly explore how common distortions appear-
ing in real scenes affect the model performance. Accura-
cies of face forgery detection on the standard test set and
the introduced hidden test set are evaluated under various
settings.
Evaluation of effectiveness of DeeperForensics-1.0. For
a fair comparison, we evaluate DeeperForensics-1.0 and the
state-of-the-art FaceForensics++ [37] dataset because they
use the same driving videos. In this setting, we use 1000
raw manipulated videos without distortions in the standard
set of DeeperForensics-1.0. For FaceForensics++, the same
split is applied to its four subsets. All the models are tested
on the hidden test set (see Table 4).
The baselines trained on the standard training set of
DeeperForensics-1.0 achieve much better performance on
the hidden test set than all the four subsets of FaceForen-
sics++. This proves the higher quality of DeeperForensics-
Table 5: The binary detection accuracy of the baselines when
trained and tested on DeeperForensics-1.0 dataset with different
distortion perturbations. We analyze different training and test-
ing settings on the standard set without distortions (std), the stan-
dard set with single-level distortions (std/sing), and the standard
set with random-level distortions (std/rand).
Train std std std std/sing std/rand std/sing std/rand
Test (acc) std std/sing std/rand std/sing std/rand std/rand std/ sing
C3D [43] 98.50 87.63 92.38 95.38 96.63 96.75 94.00
TSN [45] 99.25 91.50 95.00 98.25 98.88 98.12 99.12
I3D [11] 100.00 90.75 96.88 99.50 99.63 99.63 98.00
ResNet+LSTM [17, 19] 100.00 90.63 97.13 100.00 98.63 100.00 97.25
XceptionNet [12] 100.00 88.38 94.75 99.63 99.63 99.75 99.00
1.0 over prior works, making it more useful for real-world
face forgery detection. In Table 4, I3D [11] obtains the best
performance on the hidden test set when trained on the stan-
dard training set. We conjecture that the temporal disconti-
nuity of fake videos leads to higher accuracy by this video-
level forgery detection method.
Evaluation of dataset perturbations. We study the effect
of perturbations towards the forgery detection model per-
formance. In contrast to prior work [37], we try to evaluate
the baseline accuracies when applying different distortions
to the training and the test sets, in order to explore the func-
tion of perturbations in face forensics dataset.
In this setting, we conduct all the experiments on
DeeperForensics-1.0 dataset with high diversity of pertur-
bations. We use 1000 manipulated videos in the stan-
dard set (std), 1000 manipulated videos with single-level
(level-5), random-type distortions (std/sing), 1000 manip-
ulated videos with random-level, random-type distortions
(std/rand). The data split is the same as the standard set
with a ratio of 7 : 1 : 2.
In Column 2 of Table 5, we find the accuracy is nearly
100% when the models are trained and tested on the stan-
dard set. This is reasonable because the strong baselines
perform very well in a clean dataset with the same distri-
bution. In Columns 3 and 4, the accuracy decrease com-
pared to Column 2, when we choose std/sing and std/rand
as the test set. Most of the video-level methods except C3D
[43] are more robust to perturbations on test set than Xcep-
tionNet [12]. This setting is very common because different
distributions of the training and the test sets lead to decrease
in model accuracies. Hence, the lack of perturbations in the
face forensics dataset cutbacks the model performance for
real-world face forgery detection with even more complex
data distribution.
When we apply corresponding distortions to the training
and test set, the accuracy will increase compared to Col-
umn 3 and 4 (see Column 5 and 6 in Table 5). However,
this setting is impractical because the distributions of the
training and test sets are still the same. We should augment
the test set to better simulate the real-world distribution.
Thus, some evaluation settings in previous works [30, 37]
are unreasonable. If we swap the training set and the test
9
Table 6: The binary detection accuracy of the baselines on the
hidden test set when trained on DeeperForensics-1.0 dataset with
the standard set without distortions (std), combination of std and
the standard set with single-level distortions (std+std/sing), com-
bination of std and the standard set with random-level distortions
(std+std/rand), combination of std and the standard set with the
mixed distortions(std+std/mix).
Train std std+std/sing std+std/rand std+std/mix
Test (acc) hidden hidden hidden hidden
C3D [43] 74.75 78.25 78.13 78.88
TSN [45] 77.00 78.75 79.50 79.50
I3D [11] 79.25 80.13 80.13 80.13
ResNet+LSTM [17, 19] 78.25 80.25 79.50 80.25
XceptionNet [12] 77.00 79.75 79.75 79.88
set of std/sing and std/rand to further randomize the condi-
tion, results shown in Column 7 and 8 indicate that the high
accuracy keep unchanged. This evaluation setting shows
the possibility that with the same generation method, exert-
ing appropriate distortions to the training set can make face
forgery detection models more robust to real-world pertur-
bations.
Evaluation of variants of training set for real-world face
forgery detection. We have conducted several experiments
for evaluations of possible perturbations. Nevertheless, the
case is more complex in real scenes because information
about the fake videos is not available. The video may be
subjected to more than one type and diverse levels of distor-
tions. In addition to distortions, the method manipulating
the faces is unknown.
From the evaluation of perturbations, we find the pos-
sibility of augmenting the training set to improve detec-
tion model performance. Thus, we further evaluate base-
line performance on the hidden test set by devising some
variants of the training set. We perform experiments
on DeeperForensics-1.0. In this setting, other than std,
std/sing, and std/rand, we use 1000 more manipulated
videos, each of which is subjected to a mixture of three
random-level, random-type distortions (std/mix). We com-
bine std with std/sing, std/rand, and std/mix, respectively, to
form three new training sets (with the same data split as the
former settings).
Column 2 in Table 6 shows the low accuracy when the
models trained on std and tested on the hidden test set (the
same as Column 6 in Table 4). Columns 3 and 4 indicate the
accuracy of all the baseline models increase when trained
on std+std/sing and std+std/rand. The accuracy of I3D [11]
and ResNet+LSTM [17, 19], are over 80% in some cases.
In a more complex setting, when the models are trained on
std+std/mix, Column 5 shows the accuracy of all the detec-
tion baselines further increase.
It proves that designing suitable training set variants has
the potential to help increase the face forgery detection ac-
curacy, and applying various distortions to ensure the di-
versity of DeeperForensics-1.0 is necessary. In addition,
compared to image-level method, video-level face forgery
detection methods have more potential capabilities to crack
real-world fake videos as shown in Table 6.
Despite the accuracy on the challenging hidden test set
is still not very high, we provide two initial directions for
future real-world face forgery detection research: 1) Im-
proving the source data collection and generation method
to ensure the quality of the training set; 2) Augmenting the
training set by various distortions to ensure its diversity. We
welcome researchers to make our benchmark more compre-
hensive.
5. Discussion
In this work, we propose a new large-scale dataset
named DeeperForensics-1.0 to facilitate the research of face
forgery detection towards real-world scenarios. We make
several efforts to ensure the good quality, large scale, and
high diversity of the proposed dataset. Based on the dataset,
we further benchmark the results of existing representative
forgery detection methods, offering insights into the current
status and future improvisation strategy in face forgery de-
tection. Several topics are considered as the future works.
1) We will keep on collecting the identities of source and
target videos to further expand DeeperForensics gradually
over time. 2) We will ask interested researchers for any
results of future video falsification methods to enlarge our
hidden test set, as long as the fakes can pass the human
test supported by us. 3) A better evaluation metric for face
forgery detection methods is also an interesting research
topic.
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Appendix
A. Derivation
The core equations of DF-VAE are Eq. 2, Eq. 3, and
Eq. 4. We will provide the detailed mathematical deriva-
tions in this section.
Derivation of Eq. 2 and Eq. 3:
log pθ
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= E
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Derivation of Eq. 4:
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B. Objective
Reconstruction loss. In the reconstruction, the source face
and target face share the same forms of loss functions. The
reconstruction loss of the source face, Lreconx , can be writ-
ten as:
Lreconx = λr1Lpixel (x˜, x) + λr2Lssim (x˜, x) . (8)
Lpixel indicates pixel loss. It calculates the Mean Abso-
lute Error (MAE) after reconstruction, which can be written
as:
Lpixel (x˜, x) =
1
CHW
‖x˜− x‖1. (9)
Lssim denotes ssim loss. It computes the Structural Sim-
ilarity (SSIM) of the reconstructed face and the original
face, which has the form of:
Lssim (x˜, x) =
(2µx˜µx + C1) (2σx˜x + C2)
(µ2x˜ + µ
2
x + C1) (σ
2
x˜ + σ
2
x + C2)
. (10)
λr1 and λr2 are two hyperparameters that control the
weights of two parts of the reconstruction loss. For the tar-
get face, we have the similar form of reconstruction loss:
Lrecony = λr1Lpixel (y˜, y) + λr2Lssim (y˜, y) . (11)
Thus, the full reconstruction loss can be written as:
Lrecon = Lreconx + Lrecony . (12)
KL loss. Since DF-VAE is a new conditional variational
auto-encoder, reparameterization trick is utilized to make
the sampling operation differentiable by an auxiliary vari-
able with independent marginal. We use the typical KL loss
in [26] with the form of:
LKL (qφ (z) , pθ (z)) =
1
2
J∑
j=1
(
1 + log
(
(σj)
2)− (µj)2 − (σj)2),
(13)
where J is the dimensionality of the latent prior z, µj and
σj are the j-th element of variational mean and s.d. vectors,
respectively.
MAdaIN loss. The MAdaIN module is jointly trained with
the disentangled module in an end-to-end manner. We apply
MAdaIN loss for this module, in a similar form as described
in [20]. We use the VGG-19 [40] to compute MAdaIN loss
to train Decoder Dδ:
LMAdaIN = Lc + λmaLs. (14)
Lc denotes the content loss, which is the Euclidean dis-
tance between the target features and the features of the
swapped face. Lc has the form of:
Lc = ‖o− c‖2, (15)
where o = mbt · dt, c = mbt · dt. mbt is the blurred mask
described in Section 3.2.
Ls represents the style loss, which matches the mean
and standard deviation of the style features. Like [20], we
match the IN [44] statistics instead of using Gram matrix
loss which can produce similar results. Ls can be written
as:
Ls =
L∑
i=1
‖µ(Φi(o))− µ(Φi(s))‖2
+
L∑
i=1
‖σ(Φi(o))− σ(Φi(s))‖2,
(16)
where o = mbt · dt, s = mbt · yt. mbt is the blurred
mask described in Section 3.2. Φi denotes the layer used in
VGG-19 [40]. Similar to [20], we use relu1 1, relu2 1,
relu3 1, relu4 1 layers with equal weights.
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Figure 9: Results of user study comparing methods. The bar charts
show the number of users who give preference in each compared
pair of manipulated videos.
Table 7: The FID and IS scores of DeepFakes [2], faceswap-GAN
[4], ReenactGAN [48], and DF-VAE (Ours).
Method FID IS
DeepFakes [2] 25.771 1.711
faceswap-GAN [4] 24.718 1.685
ReenactGAN [48] 26.325 1.690
DF-VAE (Ours) 22.097 1.714
λma is the weight of style loss to balance two parts of
MAdaIN loss.
Temporal loss. We have given a detailed introduction of
temporal consistency constraint in Section 3.2. The tempo-
ral loss has the form of Eq. 7. We will not repeat it here.
Total objective. DF-VAE is an end-to-end many-to-many
face swapping framework. We jointly train all parts of the
networks. The problem can be described as the optimization
of the following total objective:
Ltotal = λ1Lrecon + λ2LKL + λ3LMAdaIN + λ4Ltemporal,
(17)
where λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4 are the weight hyperparameters of four
types of loss functions introduced above.
C. Implementation Details
The whole DF-VAE framework is end-to-end. We use
the pretrained stacked hourglass networks [33] to extract
landmarks. The numbers of stacks and blocks are set to
4 and 1, respectively. We exploit FlowNet 2.0 network [21]
to estimate optical flows. The typical AdaIN network [20]
is applied to our style matching and fusion module. The
learning rate is set to 0.00005 for all parts of DF-VAE. We
utilize Adam [24] and set β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0.999. All the
experiments are conducted on NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPUs.
D. User Study of Methods
In addition to user study based on datasets to examine
the quality of DeeperForensics-1.0 dataset, we also carry
out a user study to compare DF-VAE with state-of-the-art
face manipulation methods. We will present the user study
of methods in this section.
Baselines. We choose three learning-based open-source
methods as our baselines: DeepFakes [2], faceswap-GAN
[4], and ReenactGAN [48]. These three methods are repre-
sentative, which are based on different architectures. Deep-
Fakes [2] is a well-known method based on Auto-Encoders
(AE). It uses a shared encoder and two separated decoders
to perform face swapping. faceswap-GAN [4] is based on
Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [16], which has a
similar structure as DeepFakes [2] but also uses a paired dis-
criminators to improve face swapping quality. ReenactGAN
[48] makes a boundary latent space assumption and uses a
transformer to adapt the boundary of source face to that of
target face. As a result, ReenactGAN can perform many-
to-one face reenactment. After getting the reenacted faces,
we use our carefully designed fusion method to obtain the
swapped faces. For a fair comparison, DF-VAE utilizes the
same fusion method when compared to ReenactGAN [48].
Results. We randomly choose 30 real videos from
DeeperForensics-1.0 as the source videos and 30 real videos
from FaceForensics++ [37] as the target videos. Thus, each
method generates 30 fake videos. Same as the user study
based on datasets, we conduct the user study based on meth-
ods among 100 professional participants who specialize in
computer vision research. Because there are correspond-
ing fake videos, we let the users directly choose their pre-
ferred fake videos between those generated by other meth-
ods and those generated by DF-VAE. Finally, we got 3210
answers for each compared pair. The results are shown in
Figure 9. We can see that DF-VAE shows an impressive ad-
vantage over the baselines, underscoring the high quality of
DF-VAE-generated fake videos.
E. Quantitative Evaluation Metrics
Frechet Inception Distance (FID) [18] is a widely ex-
ploited metric for generative models. FID evaluates the sim-
ilarity of distribution between the generated images and the
real images. FID correlates well with the visual quality of
the generated samples. A lower value of FID means a better
quality.
Inception Score (IS) [38] is an early and somewhat widely
adopted objective evaluation metric for generated images.
IS evaluates two aspects of generation quality: articulation
and diversity. A higher value of IS means a better quality.
Table 7 shows the FID and IS scores of our method com-
pared to other methods. DF-VAE outperforms all the three
baselines in quantitative evaluations by FID and IS.
F. Ablation Study
Ablation study of temporal loss. Since the swapped faces
do not have the ground truth, we evaluate the effectiveness
of temporal consistency constraint, i.e., temporal loss, in a
self-reenactment setting. Similar to [23], we quantify the re-
rendering error by Euclidean distance of per pixel in RGB
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channels ([0, 255]). Visualized results are shown in Fig-
ure 10. Without the temporal loss, the re-rendering error is
higher, hence demonstrating the effectiveness of temporal
consistency constraint.
Ablation study of different components. We conduct fur-
ther ablation studies w.r.t. different components of our DF-
VAE framework under many-to-many face swapping setting
(see Figure 11). The source and target faces are shown in
Column 1 and Column 2. In Column 3, our full method,
DF-VAE, shows high-fidelity face swapping results. In Col-
umn 4, style mismatch problems are very obvious if we
remove the MAdaIN module. If we remove the hourglass
(structure extraction) module, the disentanglement of struc-
ture and appearance is not very thorough. The swapped face
will be a mixture of multiple identities, as shown in Column
5. When we perform face swapping without constructing
unpaired data in the same domain (see Column 6), the dis-
entangled module will completely reconstruct the faces on
the side of Eβ , thus the disentanglement is not established
at all. Therefore, the quality of face swapping will degrade
if we remove any component in DF-VAE framework.
G. Details of Benckmark Baselines
We will elaborate on five baselines used in our face
forgery detection benchmark in this section. Our bench-
mark contains four video-level face forgery detection meth-
ods, C3D [43], Temporal Segment Networks (TSN) [45],
Inflated 3D ConvNet (I3D) [11], and ResNet+LSTM [17,
19]. One image-level detection method, XceptionNet [12],
which achieves the best performance in FaceForensics++
[37], is evaluated as well.
• C3D [43] is a simple but effective method, which in-
corporates 3D convolution to capture the spatiotempo-
ral feature of videos. It includes 8 convolutional, 5
max-pooling, and 2 fully connected layers. The size of
the 3D convolutional kernels is 3× 3× 3. When train-
ing C3D, the videos are divided into non-overlapped
clips with 16-frames length, and the original face im-
ages are resized to 112× 112.
• TSN [45] is a 2D convolutional network, which splits
the video into short segments and randomly selects a
snippet from each segment as the input. The long-
range temporal structure modeling is achieved by the
fusion of the class scores corresponding to these snip-
pets. In our experiment, we choose BN-Inception [22]
as the backbone and only train our model with the
RGB stream. The number of segments is set to 3 as de-
fault, and the original images are resized to 224× 224.
• I3D [11] is derived from Inception-V1 [22]. It inflates
the 2D ConvNet by endowing the filters and pooling
kernels with an additional temporal dimension. In the
training, we use 64-frame snippets as the input, whose
starting frames are randomly selected from the videos.
The face images are resized to 224× 224.
• ResNet+LSTM [17, 19] is based on ResNet [17] ar-
chitecture. As a 2D convolutional framework, ResNet
[17] is used to extract spatial features (the output of the
last convolutional layer) for each face image. In order
to encode the temporal dependency between images,
we place an LSTM [19] module with 512 hidden units
after ResNet-50 [17] to aggregate the spatial features.
An additional fully connected layer serves as the clas-
sifier. All the videos are downsampled with a ratio of
5, and the images are resized to 224×224 before feed-
ing into the network. During training, the loss is the
summation of the binary entropy on the output at all
time steps, while only the output of the last frame is
used for the final classification in inference.
• XceptionNet [12] is a depthwise-separable-
convolution based CNN, which has been used in
[37] for image-level face forgery detection. We exploit
the same XceptionNet model as [37] but without
freezing the weights of any layer during training. The
face images are resized to 299×299. In the test phase,
the prediction is made by averaging classification
scores of all frames within a video.
H. More Examples of Data Collection
In this section, we will show more examples of our ex-
tensive source video data collection (see Figure 12). Our
high-quality collected data vary in identities, poses, expres-
sions, emotions, lighting conditions, and 3DMM blend-
shapes [10]. The source videos will also be released for
further research.
I. Perturbations
We will also show some examples of perturbations in
DeeperForensics-1.0. Seven types of perturbations and the
mixture of two (Gaussian blur, JPEG compression) / three
(Gaussian blur, JPEG compression, white Gaussian noise
in color components) / four (Gaussian blur, JPEG com-
pression, white Gaussian noise in color components, color
saturation change) perturbations are shown in Figure 13.
These perturbations are very common distortions existing
in real life. The comprehensiveness of perturbations in
DeeperForensics-1.0 ensures its diversity to better simulate
fake videos in real-world scenarios.
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Figure 10: The quantitative evaluation of the effectiveness of temporal loss. Similar to [23], we use the re-rendering error in a self-
reenactment setting, where the ground truth is known. The error maps show Euclidean distance of per pixel in RGB channels ([0, 255]).
The mean errors are shown above the images. The corresponding color scale w.r.t. error values is shown on the right side of the images.
Source Target Full DF-VAE w/o MAdaIN w/o hourglass w/o unpaired
Figure 11: The ablation studies of different components in DF-VAE framework in the many-to-many face swapping setting. Column 1 and
Column 2 show the source face and the target face, respectively. Column 3 shows the results of the full method. Column 4, 5, 6 show the
results when removing MAdaIN module, hourglass (structure extraction) module, and unpaired data construction, respectively.
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Figure 12: More examples of the source video data collection. Our high-quality collected data vary in identities, poses, expressions,
emotions, lighting conditions, and 3DMM blendshapes [10].
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Figure 13: Seven types of perturbations and the mixture of two (Gaussian blur, JPEG compression) / three (Gaussian blur, JPEG com-
pression, white Gaussian noise in color components) / four (Gaussian blur, JPEG compression, white Gaussian noise in color components,
color saturation change) perturbations in DeeperForensics-1.0.
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